Motivated by the question what it is that makes quantum mechanics a holistic theory (if so), I try to define for general physical theories what we mean by 'holism'. I propose an operational criterion to decide whether or not a physical theory is holistic, namely: a physical theory is holistic if and only if some determination (measurement) of the global properties in the theory which can be determined by global measurements, can not be implemented by local operations and classical communication. This approach is contrasted with the well known approaches to holism in terms of supervenience. I will argue that the latter have a limited scope and need to be extended using the criterion for holism proposed here in order to satisfactory address the issue for physical theories. I formalize this criterion for classical particle physics and Bohmian mechanics as represented on a Cartesian phase and configuration space, and for quantum mechanics (in the orthodox interpretation) using the formalism of general quantum operations as completely positive trace non-increasing maps. Furthermore, I provide an interesting example from which one can conclude that quantum mechanics is holistic in the above mentioned sense, although, perhaps surprisingly, no entanglement is needed.
Introduction
Holism is often taken to be the idea that the whole is more than the sum of the parts. Because of being too vague, this idea has only served as a guideline or intuition to sharpen the different formulations of holism. Here I shall be concerned with the one relevant to physics, i.e., the doctrine of metaphysical holism, which is the idea that properties or relations of a whole are not determined by intrinsic properties or relations of the parts 1 . This is taken to be opposed to a claim of supervenience (Healey, 1991) , to reductionism (Maudlin, 1998) , to local physicalism (Teller, 1986) , as well as taken to be opposed to particularism (Teller, 1989) . In all these cases a common approach is used to define what metaphysical holism is: via the notion of supervenience 2 . According to this common approach metaphysical holism is the idea that some facts, properties, or relations of the whole do not supervene on intrinsic properties and relations of the parts, the latter together making up the supervenience basis. As applied to physical theories, quantum mechanics is then taken to be the paradigmatic example of a holistic theory, since it is the case that certain composite states (i.e., entangled states) do not supervene on subsystem states, a feature not to be found in classical physical theories. However, in this paper I want to critically examine the supervenience approach to holism and propose a different and new criterion for deciding whether or not a physical theory is holistic. A criterion stronger than supervenience and one I believe to be more in spirit with the original intuition underlying metaphysical holism. The criterion for whether or not a theory is holistic proposed here is an operational one. It incorporates the idea that each physical theory (possibly supplemented with a property assignment rule via an interpretation) 1 This ontological holism is to be contrasted with explanatory and meaning holism. The first is the idea that explanation of a certain behavior of an object cannot be given by analyzing the component parts of that object. Think of consciousness of which some claim that it cannot be fully explained in terms of physical and chemical laws obeyed by the molecules of the brain. The second is the idea that the meaning of a term cannot be given without regarding it within the full context of its possible functioning and usage in a language. 2 The notion of supervenience, as used here, is meant to describe a particular relationship between properties of a whole and properties of the parts of that whole. The main intuition behind what particular kind of relationship is meant, is captured by the following impossibility claim. It is not possible that two things should be identical with respect to their subvenient or subjacent properties (i.e., the lowerlevel properties), without also being identical with respect to their supervening or upper-level properties. The first are the properties of the parts, the second are those of the whole. The idea is that there can be no relevant difference in the whole without a difference in the parts. (Cleland (1984) uses a different definition in terms of modal logic not used here.) has the crucial feature that it tells us how to actually determine properties of systems and subsystems. The guiding idea of the approach here suggested, is that some property of a whole would be holistic if, according to the theory in question, there is no way we can find out about it using only local means, i.e., by acting on subsystems via local operations and classical communication of the kind the theory in question allows for. The parts would then not determine the properties of the whole, not even via all possible subsystem property determinations that can be performed, and consequentially we would have some instantiation of holism.
The new approach suggested here thus focuses on property determination instead of on the supervenience of properties. It can be viewed as a shift from a static to a dynamic approach taking into account the full potential of physical theories. Another way to think about it is to think of the supervenience basis as being enlarged with some aspects of property determination. The claim I make is that this makes a crucial difference and I hope to show the fruitfulness of the new criterion by illustrating it in classical particle physics, Bohmian mechanics and orthodox quantum mechanics.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First I will present in section 2 a short review of the supervenience approaches to holism. I especially look at the supervenience basis used. To illustrate these approaches I consider what they have to say about classical physics and quantum mechanics. In the next section (section 3) I will give a different approach based on an operational stance towards property determination within physical theories. This approach is contrasted with the approaches of the previous section and argued to be a better one for addressing holism in physical theories. In order to show its fruitfulness I will apply it to different physical theories. Indeed, in section 4 it is shown to do non-trivial work. Classical particle physics and Bohmian mechanics are proven not to be holistic, whereas orthodox quantum mechanics is shown to be holistic despite the feature of entanglement, a feature that was taken to be absolutely necessary in the supervenience approaches for any holism to arise in quantum mechanics. Finally in section 5 I will recapitulate, and argue this new approach to holism to be a fruit of the rise of the new field of quantum information theory.
Supervenience approaches to holism
The idea that holism in physical theories is opposed to supervenience of properties of the whole on intrinsic properties or relations of the parts, is worked out in detail by Teller (1986) and by Healey (1991) , although others have used this idea as well, such as French (1989) 3 , Maudlin (1998) and Esfeld (2001) . I will review the first two contributions in this section.
Before discussing the specific way in which part and whole are related, Healey (1991) clears the metaphysical ground of what it means for a system to be composed out of parts, so that the whole supervenience approach can get off the ground. I take this to be unproblematic here and say that a whole is composed if it has component parts. Using this notion of composition, holism is the claim that the whole has features that cannot be reduced to features of its component parts. Both Healey (1991) and Teller (1986) use the same kind of notion for the reduction relation, namely supervenience. However, whereas Teller only speaks about relations of the whole and non-relational properties of the parts, Healey uses a broader view on what features of the whole should supervene on what features of the parts. Because of its generality I take essentially Healey's definition to be paradigmatic for the supervenience approach to holism 4 . In this approach, holism in physical theories means that there are physical properties or relations of the whole that are not supervenient on the intrinsic physical properties and relations of the component parts. An essential feature of this approach is that the supervenience basis, i.e., the properties or relations on which the whole may or may not supervene, are only the intrinsic ones, which are those which the parts have at the time in question in and out of themselves, regardless of any other individuals.
We see that there are three different aspects involved in this approach. The first has to do with the metaphysical, or ontological effort of clarifying what it means that a whole is composed out of parts. I took this to be unproblematic. The second aspect gives us the type of dependence the whole should have to the parts in order to be able to speak of holism. This was taken to be supervenience. Thirdly, and very importantly for the rest of this paper, the supervenience basis needs to be specified. Healey (1991) takes this to be 'just the qualitative, intrinsic properties and relations of the parts, i.e., the properties and relations that these bear in and out of themselves, without regard to any other objects, and irrespective of any further consequences of their bearing these properties for the properties of any wholes they might compose.' Similarly Teller (1986) uses 'properties internal to a thing, properties which a thing has independently of the existence or state of other objects.'
Although the supervenience basis is hard to specify precisely, the idea is that we should not add global properties or relations to this basis. It is supposed to contain only what we intuitively think to be non-holistic. However, as I hope to show in the next sections this supervenience basis is too limited when considering physical theories. For they allow for specific forms of property assignment and property determination and these processes have intuitively clear non-holistic features which should be included in the supervenience basis as well, such as classical communication.
However, before presenting the new approach, I discuss how the supervenience approach treats classical physics and quantum mechanics (in the orthodox interpretation). In treating these two theories I will first present some general aspects related to the structure of properties these theories allow for, since they are also needed in future sections.
Classical physics in the supervenience approach
Classical physics assigns two kinds of properties to a system. State independent or fixed properties that remain unchanged (such as mass and charge) and dynamical properties associated with quantities called dynamical variables (such as position and momentum) (Healey, 1991) . It is the latter we are concerned with in order to address holism in a theory since these are subject to the dynamical laws the theory contains. Thus in order to ask whether or not classical physics is holistic we need to specify how parts and wholes get assigned the dynamical properties in the theory 5 . This ontological issue is unproblematic in classical physics, for it views objects as bearers of determinate properties (both fixed and dynamical ones). The epistemological issue of how to gain knowledge of these properties is treated via the idea of measurement. A measurement is any physical operation by which the value of a physical quantity can be determined. Measurement reveals this value because it is assumed that the system has the property that the quantity in question has that value at the time of measurement. There is no fundamental difference between observer and observed or between measurement and any other physical process. Isham (1995) puts it as follows: 'Properties are intrinsically attached to the object as it exists in the world, and measurement is nothing more than a particular type of physical interaction designed to display the value of a specific quantity.' The bridge between ontology and epistemology, i.e., between property assignment (for any properties to exist at all (in the theory)) and property determination (to gain knowledge about them), is an easy and unproblematic one called measurement.
The specific way the the dynamical properties of an object are encoded in the formalism of classical physics is in a state space Ω of physical states x of a system. This is a Cartesian phase space where at each time a unique state x can be assigned to the system. Systems or ensembles can be described by pure states which are single points x in Ω or by mixed states which are unique convex combinations of the pure states. The set of dynamical properties determines the position of the system in the phase space Ω and conversely the dynamical properties of the system can be directly determined from the coordinates of the point in phase space. Thus, a one-to-one correspondence exists between systems and their dynamical properties on the one hand, and the mathematical representation in terms of points in phase space on the other. Furthermore, with observation of properties being unproblematic, the state corresponds uniquely to the outcomes of the (ideal) measurements that can be performed on the system. The specific property assignment rule for dynamical properties that captures the above is the following.
A physical quantity A is represented by a function A : Ω → R such that A(x) is the value A possesses when the state is x. To the property that the value of A lies in the real-valued interval ∆ there is associated a Borel-measurable subset
of states in Ω for which the proposition that the system has this property is true. Thus dynamical properties are associated with subsets of the space of states Ω. Furthermore, the logical structure of the propositions about the dynamical properties of the system is identified with the Boolean algebra structure on the subsets of the space of states Ω. This encodes the normal logical way (i.e., Boolean logic) of dealing with propositions about system properties.
However, in order to address holism we need to be able to speak about properties of composite systems in terms of properties of the subsystems. The first I will call global properties, the second local properties 6 . It is a crucial and almost defining feature of the state space of classical physics that the local dynamical properties suffice for determination of all global dynamical properties. This is formalised as follows. To the property that the value of B of a composite system 7 lies in ∆ there is associated a Borel-measurable subset of Ω, for which the proposition that the system has this property is true:
This subset can be decomposed in terms of the subsystem properties as follows
for some function f A 1 ,A 2 and some subsystem physical quantities A 1 and A 2 and values a 1,i and a 2,j . Note that x 1 and x 2 are the subsystem states that each lie in the state space Ω 1 or Ω 2 of the respective subsystem. The limit of Ω 1,i and Ω 2,j to zero is taken 8 such that these intervals become single points x 1,i and x 2,j .
Eq.
(3) tells us that an arbitrary set in the product space Ω is in the limit a conjunction of the product sets (x 1,i , x 2,j ) and furthermore that the global quantity B having a value in ∆ is a function of the subsystem properties A 1 and A 2 each having a certain value a 1,i and a 2,j respectively. The global property that quantity B has a specific value in ∆ is thus determined by the local 9 properties that the quantities A 1 and A 2 each have a value a 1,i and a 2,j such that f A 1 ,A 2 (a 1,i , a 2,j ) ∈ ∆. Note that the latter is in turn determined by the subsystems states x 1,i and x 2,j . The determination of B thus goes via the function f A 1 ,A 2 . That such a function can always be found for every quantity of a composite system is a property of the particular phase space Ω being a Cartesian space.
The above means that the boolean algebra of the properties of the composed system is the product algebra of the subsystem algebras (when closed under disjunction) 10 . Thus propositions about global properties (e.g., B having a ization to more subsystems is trivial. 8 In the infinite case the sum over i and j becomes an integral. 9 See footnote 6.
certain value) can be written as disjunctions of propositions which are conjunctions of propositions about local properties alone (e.g., A 1 and A 2 having certain values). In other words, the truth value of all propositions about B having a certain value can be determined from the truth value of disjunctions of properties about A 1 and A 2 each having a certain value. The first and the latter thus have the same extension.
From this we conclude, and so is concluded in the supervenience approach, although on other non-formal grounds, that classical physics is not holistic.
For the global properties supervene on the local ones because the values of the quantities pertaining to the global properties are determined as in Eq.
(3) via ordinary functions of the values pertaining to the subsystem properties and therefore can be determined by these properties. The supervenient relation is the functional relation f A 1 ,A 2 .
For concreteness I will give two examples of such supervenient relations, i.e., examples of the function f A 1 ,A 2 . The first is q = | q 1 − q 2 | which gives us the global property of a system that specifies what the distance between its two subsystems is. The second is − → F = − ∇V (| q 1 − q 2 |) which gives us the property of a system that says how strong the force is between its subsystems arising from the potential V . This could for example be the potential m 1 m 2 G | q 1 − q 2 | for the Newtonian gravity force. Although both examples are highly non-local and could involve action at a distance, no holism is involved since the global properties supervene on the local ones. Teller (1986) puts it like this: 'Neither action at a distance nor distant spatial separation threaten to enter the picture to spoil the idea of the world working as a giant mechanism, understandable in terms of the individual parts.' Some words about the issue of whether spatial relations are to be considered holistic, are in order here. We have seen that the distance q between two systems is supervenient on the systems having fixed positions q 1 and q 2 in the sense expressed by Eq. (3). In the above construction the spatial relations among the parts of a whole are thus supervenient upon local properties, and they are thus not to be included in the supervenience basis This could look suspicious because one often does include the spatial relations in the supervenience basis 11 . The reason for this is that one has the idea that that they are to be regarded as intrinsically relational, and therefore non-supervening on the subsystem properties, but nevertheless non-holistic. Cleland (1984) and French (1989) for example argue spatial relations to be non-supervening relations. Furthermore, some hold that all other intrinsic relations can be regarded to be supervenient upon these. The intuition is that wholes seem to be built out of their parts if arranged in the right spatial relations, and these spatial relations are taken to be in some sense monadic 12 .
Although the property of relative distance of the whole indicates the way in which the parts are related with respect to position, whereby it is not the case that each of the parts has a position independent of the other one, it is here not regarded a holistic property since it is supervening on spatial position. However, the argumentation given here requires position to be an intrinsic property of a system. But one can deny this and adopt a relational account of space and then spatial relations become monadic and positions become relative, which has the consequence that one has to incorporate spatial relations in the supervenience basis. So we see that issues depend on what view one has about the nature of space (or space-time). Here I will not argue for any position, but mention that if one considers bodies to have a fixed position (i.e., take an absolutist stance towards space) then spatial relations can be considered to be supervening on the positions of the relata in the manner indicated by the decomposition of Eq. (3).
As a final note in this section, I mention that because of the one-to-one correspondence between physical quantities and states on the state space of classical physics, and because composite states are uniquely determined by subsystem states (as can be seen by Eq. (3)), it suffices to consider the state space of a system to answer whether or not some holism will be found. The supervenience basis is thus determined by the state space (supplemented with the fixed properties). That this contrasts with the quantum mechanical case and that the supervenience approach does not take this into account, is in essence the critique I will state later on. The supervenience approach limits itself to the quantum mechanical state space in determining whether or not quantum mechanics is holistic, neglecting any other relevant features of the formalism, such as property determination. This will be discussed next.
Quantum physics in the supervenience approach
In this section I will first treat some general aspects of the quantum mechanical formalism before discussing how the supervenience approach deals with this theory.
In quantum mechanics, just as in classical physics, systems are assigned two 12 Healey (1991) phrases this as follows: 'Spatial relations are of special significance because they seem to yield the only clear example of qualitative, intrinsic relations required in the supervenience basis in addition to the qualitative intrinsic properties of the relata. Other intrinsic relation supervene on spatial relations.' This is the doctrine of spatial holism. kinds of properties. On the one hand, the fixed properties that we find in classical physics supplemented with some new ones such as intrinsic spin. On the other hand, dynamical properties such as components of spin (Healey, 1991) . These dynamical properties are, again just as in classical physics, determined in a certain way by values observables have when the system is in a particular state. However, the state space and observables are represented quite differently from what we have already seen in classical physics. In general, a quantum state does not correspond uniquely to the outcomes of the measurements that can be performed on the system. Instead, the system is assigned a specific Hilbert space H as its state space and the physical state of the system is represented by a state vector | ψ in the pure case and a density operator ρ in the mixed case. Any physical quantity or observable A is represented by a self-adjoint operatorÂ. Furthermore, the spectrum ofÂ is the set of possible values the quantity A can have upon measurement.
The pure state | ψ can be considered to assign a probability distribution p i = | ψ| i | 2 to an orthogonal set of states { | i } (one of them being | ψ ) which is completely concentrated onto the vector | ψ . The state | ψ can thus be regarded as the analogon of a δ-distribution on the classical phase space Ω, such as used in statistical physics. However the radical difference is that the pure quantum states do not (in general) form an orthonormal set. This implies that the pure state | ψ will also assign a positive probability to a different state | φ if they are non-orthogonal and thus have overlap, i.e., if φ| ψ = 0. This is contrary to the classical case, where the pure state δ(q − q 0 , p − p 0 ) concentrated on (p 0 , q 0 ) ∈ Ω will always give rise to a probability distribution that assigns probability zero to every other pure state, since pure states on Ω have no overlap. Furthermore, the probability that the value of an observablê B lies in the real interval X when the system is in the quantum state ρ is T r (ρPB ,X ) where PB ,X is the projector associated to the pair (B, X) by the spectral theorem for self-adjoint operators. This probability is in general not concentrated in {0, 1} even when ρ is a pure state. Only in the special case that the state is an eigenstate of the observableB it is concentrated in {0, 1}, and the system is assigned the corresponding eigenvalue with certainty. From this we see that there is no one-to-one correspondence between values an observable can obtain and states of the quantum system.
Because of this failure of a one-to-one correspondence there are interpretations of quantum mechanics that postulate different connections between the state the system is in and the dynamical properties it possesses. Whereas in classical physics this was taken to be unproblematic and natural, in quantum mechanics it turns out to be problematic and non-trivial. But a connection must be given in order to ask about any holism, since we have to be able to speak about possessed properties and thus an interpretation that gives us a property assignment rule is necessary. Here I will consider the well-known orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics that uses the so called eigenstate-eigenvalue link for this connection: a physical system has the property that quantity A has a fixed value if and only if its state is an eigenstate of the operatorÂ corresponding to A. This value is the eigenvalue associated with the particular eigenvector. Furthermore, in the orthodox interpretation measurements are taken to be ideal von Neumann measurements, whereby upon measurement the system is projected into an eigenstate of the observable being measured and the value found is the eigenvalue corresponding to that particular eigenstate. The probability for this eigenvalue to occur is given by the well known Born rule i| ρ | i , with | i the eigenstate that is projected upon and ρ the state of the system before measurement. Systems thus have properties only if they are in an eigenstate of the corresponding observables, i.e., the system either already is or must first be projected into such an eigenstate by the process of measurement. We thus see that the epistemological scheme of how we gain knowledge of properties, i.e., the measurement process described above, serves also as an ontological one defining what properties of a system can be regarded to exist at a given time at all.
Let me now go back to the supervenience approach to holism and ask what it says about quantum mechanics in the orthodox interpretation stated above. According to all proponents of this approach mentioned in the Introduction quantum mechanics is holistic. The reason for this is supposed to be the feature of entanglement, a feature not to be found in classical physics. In order to discuss the argument used, let me first present some aspects of entanglement. Entanglement is a property of composite quantum systems whereby the state of the system cannot be derived from any combination of the subsystem states. It is due to the tensor product structure of a composite Hilbert space and the linear superposition principle of quantum mechanics. In the simplest case of two subsystems, the precise definition is that the composite state ρ cannot be written as a convex sum of single particle states ρ i , thus ρ = i p i ρ 1 i ⊗ ρ 2 i , with p i ∈ [0, 1] and i p i = 1. In the pure case an entangled state is a superposition state such as for example the singlet state | ψ − and triplet state | φ − of a spin 1/2-particle. They can be written as
with | 0 z and | 1 z eigenstates of the spin operatorŜ z = 2σ z , i.e., the spin up and down state in the z-direction respectively. These singlet and triplet states are eigenstates for total spin of the composite system given by the observablê S 2 = (Ŝ 2 1 +Ŝ 2 2 ) with eigenvalue 0 and 2 2 respectively. Note that they cannot be written as a product of single particle states.
According to the orthodox interpretation, if the composite system is in one of the states of Eq. (4), the system possesses one of two global properties for total spin which are completely different, namely eigenvalue 0 and eigenvalue 2 2 .
The question now is whether or not this spin property is holistic, i.e., does it or does it not supervene on subsystem properties? According to the supervenience approach it does not and the argument goes as follows. Since the individual subsystems have the same reduced state, namely the completely mixed state 1 2 ½, and because these are not eigenstates of any spin observable, no spin property at all can be assigned to them. So there is a difference in global properties to which no difference in the local properties of the subsystems corresponds. Therefore there is no supervenience and we have an instantiation of holism 13 . It is the feature of entanglement present in this example that is held responsible for the holism arising. Maudlin (1998) even defines holism in quantum mechanics in terms of entanglement and Esfeld (2001) puts it as follows: 'The entanglement of two or more states is the basis for the discussion on holism in quantum physics.' Also French (1989) , using a different approach to supervenience (see footnote 3), shares this view: 'Since the state function [...] is not a product of the separate state functions of the particles, one cannot [...] ascribe to each particle an individual state function. It is this, of course, which reveals the peculiar non-classical holism of quantum mechanics.'
I would now like to make an observation on a crucial aspect of the reasoning the supervenience approach uses to conclude that quantum mechanics endorses holism. In the above and also in other cases the issue is treated via the concept of entanglement of quantum states. This, however, is a notion primarily tied to the structure of the state space of quantum mechanics, i.e., the Hilbert space, and not to the structure of the properties assigned in the interpretation in question. There is no one-to-one correspondence between states and assigned dynamical properties, contrary to the classical case, as we have already seen. Thus questions in terms of states, such as 'is there any entanglement present?' and in terms of properties such as 'is there non-supervenience?' are different in principle. And although there is some connection via the property assignment rule using the eigenvalue-eigenstate link, I claim them to be relevantly different, and therefore a different approach, that focuses directly on property determination and that probes the structure of the assigned properties and not just that of the state space, might be more fruitful. This I hope to show in the next section.
The reason that in the supervenience approach one immediately and solely looks at the structure of the state space is because in its supervenience basis only the properties the subsystems have in and out of themselves at the time in question are regarded. This means that for the dynamical properties one focuses on properties the system has in so far as the state of the system im-plies. Thus only eigenstates give rise to properties, other states such as mixed states do not. A different approach, still in the orthodox interpretation, would be to focus on properties the system can possess according to the possible property determinations quantum mechanics allows for. It is the structure of the properties that can be possibly assigned at all, which is then at the heart of our investigations, as it should be. In this view one could say that the physical state of a system is regarded more generally, as also Howard (1989) does, as a set of dispositions for the system to manifest certain properties under certain (measurement) circumstances, whereby the pure states are a special case assigning properties with certainty. This will be worked out next.
An operational criterion for holism in physical theories
Before presenting the new criterion for holism I would like to motivate this new criterion by going back to the example of the last section. Let us consider the example, which according to the supervenience approach gives an instantiation of holism, from a different point of view. Instead of solely considering state descriptions, let us look at what physical processes can actually be performed on the system according to the theory in question. I call this an operational stance. I will show next that it then is possible to determine, using only nonholistic means (to be precisely specified later on) whether or not one is dealing with the singlet state | ψ − or the triplet state | φ − of Eq. (4). How? First measure on each subsystem the spin in the z-direction. Next, compare these results using classical communication. If the results have the same parity, the composite system was in the triplet state with global spin property 2 2 . And if the results do not have the same parity, the system was in the singlet state with global spin property 0.
Thus using local means and classical communication the different global properties can be determined after all. There is no indication of holism in this case, contrary to what we have been told in the previous section. Although it is indeed true that the mixed reduced states of the individual subsystems do not determine the composite state and neither a local observable (of which there is no eigenstate), enough information can be nevertheless gathered by local operations and classical communication to determine the global property. We see that we should not get stuck on the fact that the subsystems themselves have no spin property because they are not in an eigenstate of a spin observable. We can assign them a state, and thus can perform measurements and assign them some local properties, which in this case do determine the global property in question.
From this example we see that holism is a thesis about the structure of properties assigned to a whole and to its parts, not a thesis about the state space of a theory. Then how do we spot candidates for holism? Two elements are crucial. Firstly, the theory must contain global properties that cannot be determined from the local properties assigned to the subsystems, while, secondly, we must take into account non-holistic constraints on the determination of the properties. These constraints are taken to be that one only uses local operations and classical communication (LOCC). The guiding intuition is that local operations, i.e., anything we do on the separate subsystems, and classically communicating whatever we find out about it, will only provide us with nonholistic features of the whole. I thus propose to study the physical realizability of measuring or determining global properties while taking as a constraint that one only uses LOCC. From this we finally get the following criterion for holism in a physical theory:
A physical theory with a property assignment rule is holistic if and only if some determination (measurement) of the global properties in the theory which can be determined by global measurements, can not be implemented by LOCC.
Note that this criterion works for all theories with a property assignment rule and a specification of what LOCC is in the theory.
What is the relationship of this approach to the supervenience approach of section 2? The following structure arises. The operational criterion implies the supervenience criterion, but the converse does not hold. Thus if a theory is not holistic in the supervenience approach it neither is in the one here presented, but this does not hold the other way around. This can be seen as follows. If properties of the whole cannot be determined using properties obtained via LOCC, then neither can they be supervenient upon them, because the properties in the supervenience basis of the supervenience approach are in fact all obtainable via local operations and possibly some classical communication. However, if properties of the whole supervene on properties of the parts, then measuring the latter allows for determination of the first. Furthermore, if global properties do no supervene upon the whole in the above mentioned sense, it could be the case that they are nevertheless obtainable using LOCC, as was the case in the example discussed at the beginning of this section concerning the global spin property of the bi-partite system. From this we see that the criterion proposed here is a stronger one.
Let me mention some aspects of the preceding approach before it is applied to produce non-trivial work in the next section. Firstly, it tries to formalize the question of holism in the context of what modern physical theories are, taking them to be (i) schemes to find out what the results are of certain interventions that allow for determination of assigned properties, and (ii), although not relevant here, possibly describing physical reality. Theories are no longer taken to necessarily present us with an ontological picture of the world specified by the properties of all things possessed at a given time. Secondly, the approach treats the concept of property physically and not ontologically. I mean by this that the concept is treated analogous to the way Einstein treated space and time (as that what is given by measuring rods and revolutions of clocks), namely as that which can be attributed to a system when measuring it, or that which determines the outcomes of interventions. Thirdly, by including the possibility of classical communication, this approach considers the possibility of determining some intrinsic relations among the parts such as the spatial relations these parts have 14 . The parts are considered as parts, i.e., as constituting a whole with other parts and therefore being related to each other. But the idea is that they are nevertheless considered non-holistically by considering only local operations and classical communication for determining the content of intrinsic properties and relations of the parts. Lastly, one could say that in comparison to the supervenience approach of section 2, the supervenience basis is enlarged by including some global relations between the parts as intrinsic ones determined non-holistically via classical communication. And because they are non-holistic ones the basis is not made too large so as to render it useless, but is in fact relevantly enriched.
4 Holism in classical physics and quantum mechanics; revisited.
Classical Physics and Bohmian Mechanics
Classical physics was deemed non-holistic in section 2.1 because global properties in this theory were argued to be supervening on subsystem properties (just as the supervenience approaches have concluded) and it is therefore by implication also non-holistic according to operational approach of the last section. Although straightforward, it is thus not necessary to specify what LOCC means in classical physics on a Cartesian phase space.
Another interesting theory that also uses a Cartesian space as its state space is Bohmian mechanics. It has a property assignment rule just as in classical physics. Indeed, pure physical states of a system are given by single points ( q) of the position variables q that together make up a Cartesian configuration space. The dynamics is then given by the quantum potential U QM ( q) determined by the quantum mechanical state | ψ and which is possibly non-local, supplemented with the ordinary classical potential V ( q), such that the force 14 Using this criterion spatial relations are almost trivially non-holistic (just communicate the spatial locations each subsystem has and determine the distance in between) whereas in the supervenience approach a lot of work was to be done via the decomposition of Eq. (3). on a particle is given by:
In section 2.1 all theories on a Cartesian state space and using a property assignment rule just as in classical physics were deemed non-holistic and therefore we can conclude that Bohmian mechanics is non-holistic in both approaches. Thus all global properties in this theory supervene on local properties and are all obtainable by LOCC.
Because Bohmian mechanics and quantum mechanics in the orthodox interpretation have the same empirical content, one might think that because the first is not holistic, neither is the latter. However, this is not the case, as will be shown next. This illustrates the fact that an interpretation of a theory, in so far as a property assignment rule is to be given, is crucial for the question of holism. A formalism on its own is not enough.
Quantum Operations and Holism
In this section I will show that quantum mechanics in the orthodox interpretation is holistic using the operational criterion of section 3, without using the feature of entanglement. In order to do this we need to specify what a local operation is and what is meant by classical communication in the context of quantum mechanics. Let us first look at a general quantum process S that takes a state ρ of a system on a certain Hilbert space H 1 to a different state σ on a possibly different Hilbert space H 2 , i.e.,
where S : H 1 → H 2 is a completely positive trace-nonincreasing map. This is an operator S acting linearly on Hermitian matrices such that ½ ⊗ S takes states to states. These maps are also called quantum operations 15 . Any quantum process, such as for example unitary evolution or measurement, can be represented by such a quantum operation.
The class of LOCC operations is the class of local operations plus two-way classical communication. It consists of compositions of the following two elementary operations
with S A and S B local quantum operations. The class contains the identity and is closed under composition and taking tensor products. As an example consider the case where A performs a measurement and communicates her result α to B, after which B performs his measurement:
We see that B can condition his measurement on the outcome that A obtained. This example can be extended to many such rounds in which A and B each perform certain local operations on their part of the system and can condition their choices on what is communicated to them.
Suppose now that we have a physical quantity R of a bi-partite system with a corresponding operatorR that has a set of nine eigenstates, | ψ 1 to | ψ 9 , with eigenvalues 1 to 9. The property assignment we consider is the following: if the system is in an eigenstate | ψ i then it has the property that quantity R has the fixed value i. SupposeR works on H = H A ⊗ H B (each three dimensions) and has the following complete orthonormal set of non-entangled eigenstates:
We want to determine if the composite system has the property that the value of the observable R is one of the numbers 1 to 9, using only LOCC operations performed by two observers A and B, that each have one of the individual subsystems. This amounts to determining which eigenstate A and B have or project on during the measurement. If A and B project on eigenstate | ψ i then to the measurement outcome i there is associated a quantum operation S i : ρ → S i (ρ) Tr[S i (ρ)] , with projection operators S i = | i A | i B ψ i |. The state | i A denotes the classical record of the outcome of the measurement that A writes down, and similarly for | i B . These records can be considered to be local properties of the subsystems A and B 16 . Implementing the quantum operation S(ρ) = i S i ρS † i amounts to determining the global property assignment given byR. This cannot be done using LOCC, a result obtained by Bennett et al. (1999) . For the complete proof see the original article by Bennett et al. (1999) or Walgate & Hardy (2002) 17 , but a sketch of it goes as follows. If A or B perform von Neumann measurements in any of their operation and communication rounds then the distinguishability of the states is spoiled. Spoiling occurs in any local basis. The ensemble of states as seen by A or by B alone is therefore non-orthogonal, although the composite states are in fact orthogonal.
From this we see that a physical quantity, whose corresponding operator has only product eigenstates, gives a property assignment using the eigenvalueeigenstate link that is not implementable using LOCC. Thus according to the criterion sketched in the previous section quantum mechanics is holistic. Furthermore, since no entanglement is involved, the supervenience approach would give the opposite conclusion.
Conclusion and outlook
I sketched an operational criterion for holism that determines whether or not a physical theory with a property assignment rule is holistic. The supervenience approach was found to be of limited use because it neglects the operational criteria for property determination one encounters in all physical theories. Furthermore, we have seen that the supervenience basis is not determined by the state space. In other words, holism is not a thesis about the state space a theory uses, it is about the structure of properties and property assignments to a whole and its parts that a theory or an interpretation allows for. And in investigating what it allows for we need to try to formalize what we intuitively think of as holistic and non-holistic. Here, I hope to have given a satisfactory formulation of this, that allows one to go out into the world of physics and apply the new criterion to the theories or interpretations one encounters.
In this paper I have only treated some specific physical theories. It was shown that all theories on a Cartesian state space, such as classical physics and Bohmian mechanics, are not holistic. Only the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics was found to instantiate holism. What is it that we can single out to be the cause of the holism found? The use of a Hilbert space with its feature of superposition? Perhaps, but not the kind of superposition that gives rise to entanglement, for I have argued that it is not entanglement that we should per se consider to be the example of holism. Should we blame the property assignment rule which the orthodox interpretation uses? I leave this an open problem.
The two quantum mechanical examples of section 2.2 and 4.2 show us that mented by LOCC and von Neumann measurements. This is proven by Chen & Li (2003) .
we can do more or less than quantum states at first seem to tell us. This is an insight gained from the new field of quantum information theory. Its focus on what one can or cannot do with quantum systems, although often from an engineering point of view, has produced a new and powerful way of dealing with questions in the foundations of quantum mechanics. I hope the new criterion for holism in physical theories suggested in this paper is an inspiring example of this. Furthermore, and finally, the operational view expounded here is an example of the idea that we might get fundamental new insights or foundational principles from investigating what we can and can not do quantum mechanically.
